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Abstract 
 
Intrusion-tolerant group membership protocols constitute an important part of intrusion-
tolerant group communication systems. These protocols maintain a consistent system-
wide view of correct group members in the presence of malicious failures. This paper 
presents a new intrusion-tolerant group membership protocol. This protocol provides two 
unique features. First, it introduces a new membership state called a suspended 
membership state. A suspended group membership state provides a good balance 
between the amount of time a malicious/compromised group member gets to launch 
attacks before being removed from the group and the increased vulnerability to denial-of-
service attacks if a suspected member is removed too early from the group. Second, it 
introduces a clean, logical separation between the functionality of detecting malicious 
processes and removing malicious group members from the group. This logical 
separation aids in simplifying the group membership protocol design and efficiently 
detecting suspicious process behaviors. The protocol has been implemented and the paper 
provides a detailed performance analysis. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
High availability and trustworthiness are perhaps the most important requirements of modern 
computing systems. Group communication services have been successfully used to construct a 
large number of highly available, fault-tolerant, and high performance applications that can run in 
a heterogeneous, wide-area network [1, 2, 3, 7, 17, 20, and 33]. Informally, these services are 
comprised of a set of protocols that provide system-level support for object replication in the 
presence of node and communication failures. 
 
A group membership protocol is an important part of a group communication service. Informally, 
it maintains a system-wide, consistent view of correct group members at any point in time. 
Designing a correct group membership protocol is very complex because of the difficulty in 
distinguishing between a process failure and a communication failure in an asynchronous 
distributed computing system. A large number of group membership protocols have been 
designed and implemented over the past 15 years [1, 2, 3, 8, 17, 20, and 33]. Almost all of these 
protocols (exceptions: [16, 25, 31]) have been designed to tolerate only crash/performance 
failures [9] of communication or computing components. Given the recent threat of security 
attacks with malicious intentions on modern computing systems, it is important that the next 
generation of group communication services be designed to tolerate more complex types of 
component failures, such as Byzantine failures. 
 
This paper presents the design, implementation, and evaluation of a group membership protocol 
that can tolerate Byzantine failures. This group membership protocol is a part of a trustworthy 
group communication system called FITS (Flexible Intrusion Tolerant Group Communications 
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System) that we are currently building. FITS consists of a trustworthiness detector [21], a 
trustworthy group membership protocol (presented in this paper), and an atomic broadcast 
protocol. It provides two unique features. First, unlike most group communication services 
proposed in the past, FITS is designed to support object replication in the presence of Byzantine 
failures. Second, FITS explicitly incorporates techniques to address the fundamental problem of 
correctly detecting Byzantine failures in a timely manner. It is intended to be a practical solution 
for providing object replication support in a hostile computing environment, where the security of 
a small number of nodes may be compromised and adversaries may attempt to launch malicious 
security attacks including denial-of-service attacks. 
 
The group membership protocol presented here provides group membership support in the 
presence of Byzantine process failures. In particular, there are three important contributions that 
this group membership protocol provides. First, it introduces a new concept of suspended group 
membership state. A suspended group membership state provides a good balance between the 
amount of time a malicious/compromised group member gets to launch attacks before being 
removed from the group and the increased vulnerability to denial-of-service attacks if a suspected 
member is removed too early from the group. Suspected membership state is a new concept that 
has the potential to significantly improve the robustness of group communication systems. The 
second contribution of this paper lies in introducing a clean logical separation between the 
functionality of detecting malicious processes and removing malicious group members from the 
group. Existing intrusion-tolerant group communication systems tend to integrate the failure 
detection process with group membership or atomic broadcast protocol. This logical separation 
aids in simplifying the group membership protocol design and efficiently detecting suspicious 
process behavior. Finally, a prototype of the proposed group membership protocol has been built, 
and the paper provides performance evaluation. This is important, because there is a significant 
lack of any quantitative analysis of the cost of intrusion tolerance at present. There is a critical 
need for performance data quantifying the cost of providing intrusion tolerance in modern 
computing systems. The performance evaluation discussed in the paper has provided useful 
insight into detecting malicious behaviors of group members and removing suspected processes 
from the group. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some of the related work in 
building intrusion-tolerant group membership protocols. Section 3 describes the main motivation 
behind designing a new intrusion-tolerant group membership protocol. This section also 
introduces the new suspended group membership state. Section 4 describes the details of our 
group membership protocol and Section 5 describes the prototype implementation and 
performance evaluation of the protocol. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 Related Work 
 
Group Membership Protocols are a common paradigm in providing process group level 
consistency. To build highly available and correct services, there was a need to replicate servers. 
This led to development of fault tolerant group communication systems. Several group 
communication systems were built to handle different kinds of faults. The earlier efforts to build 
fault tolerant reliable group communication systems were equipped to only handle crash failures. 
Some of the earlier systems that handled crash failures are Isis [3], Consul [17], Totem [1], 
Ensemble [28], Horus [33], Spread [2], Pinwheel [10] and Timewheel [20]. 
 
Related projects aiming to provide intrusion tolerance at the middleware level using a group 
communication service include Rampart [29, 30, 31], ITUA [25, 26, 27], and SecureRing [15, 
 2
University of Colorado, Department of Computer Science Technical Report CU-CS-967-04 
16]. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance [4] is another work that describes a state machine 
replication protocol that correctly tolerates Byzantine faults. Rampart [29] is the first group 
membership protocol that aims to tolerate malicious intrusions. It uses a three-phase commit 
protocol and provides strong consistency guarantees. Rampart’s fault detection mechanism relies 
on fault detection from an external fault detector. The Three-phase commit protocol starts when 
at least one-third of group members agree to remove a faulty member. Rampart uses a manager-
based structure, where the manager is responsible for suggesting the new view. Rampart can 
handle only one fault at a time. If multiple failures occur, they are treated one by one in a 
sequential order. 
 
SecureRing [16] uses the logical token ring mechanism to disseminate data and maintain 
membership information. SecureRing also tolerates malicious faults and it claims to have lower 
cost of digital signatures due to message packing. Message digests in a signed token allow a 
single digital signature to cover multiple messages. Like Rampart, the membership protocol starts 
when at least one-third of group members agree to remove a faulty member. SecureRing can 
handle multiple faults during a single membership round by adding all faulty members into a to-
be-remove set. 
 
ITUA [26] adopts the Rampart approach, but adds capability to handle multiple faults in a single 
round. ITUA group membership protocol provides a suspect interface [of the form suspect to all 
the protocols in its group communication stack with the capability that any protocol in that stack ( 
including the group membership protocol) can invoke the interface if it suspects the peer protocol 
has deviated from its specification. The leader of the group initiates the group membership 
protocol when at least one-third of the group member suspects a faulty member. The group 
membership ends when all faulty members are removed from the group and the new view is 
installed. The protocol uses many time-outs to measure faulty behavior; hence it can suffer from 
the long idle time of applications during view installation if new faulty member is detected when 
the protocol is in the last phase.  
 
3 Motivation 
 
Intrusion-tolerant group membership protocols must deal with two difficult issues. First, they 
need to deal with the difficulty of detecting Byzantine failures. In particular, group membership 
protocols are time consuming and any application implemented on top of group communication 
system becomes unavailable while the underlying group membership protocol is in progress. As a 
result, these protocols must ensure that they are invoked only when it is fairly certain that the 
security of a member has been compromised. Second, they must ensure that a compromised 
group member gets as little time as possible to launch malicious attacks on the group 
communication system. In particular, a compromised group member should be removed from its 
group as soon as possible, so that it does not get much time to inflict damages in the group 
communication system. These two issues are contradictory in nature. The first issue entails that 
the group membership protocol be invoked only after it is fairly certain that the security of a 
group member has been compromised. However, because of the inherent difficulty in detecting 
Byzantine failures, it may take a relatively long period of time to be fairly certain that the security 
of a group member has been compromised. Thus, the first issue essentially results in delaying an 
invocation of a group membership protocol. The second issue, on the other hand, entails that a 
group membership protocol be invoked as soon as there is even a slight suspicion that a group 
member is faulty [32]. 
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For a group membership protocol to start, more than 1/3rd of the total number of group members 
should agree on the removal of the suspected group member. The problem with this requirement 
is that this can result in a long waiting period for taking action on suspected group members. We 
observed in [19] that the detection time to suspect a compromised group member by 1/3rd of the 
group members is significantly larger than the detection time by a first group member. During the 
time interval between the time the first group member suspects a compromised group member 
and the time when 1/3rd of the group agree on the suspicion of that member, there is a high 
potential that this “suspect” member can harm the system. This would be potentially dangerous as 
the suspected group member cannot only harm the system but also spread its effects and 
consequently achieve inconsistencies in the group (despite its removal from the group). All 
existing intrusion tolerant group membership protocols [16, 26, and 29] suffer from this problem. 
This issue can be addressed by making a slight modification to the mechanism of initialization of 
the group membership protocol. The mechanism of preventing/limiting the effects of a suspected 
member from harming the group activity is handled by the Pre-Membership phase of our 
protocol.  
 
We introduce this phase so that a malicious group member who is suspected by another group 
member is immediately suspended (“ineffective with respect to the group activity”) on consent 
from the sequencer (leader) so that it is prevented from causing any damage to the group 
membership and hence the application service built on top of it. A member that is suspended 
enters a new membership state called Suspended Membership State. This mechanism waits to 
start the actual membership (Three Phase Commit) protocol only after it is guaranteed that the 
members in the group have suspected the actual faulty/malicious processes and have the 
agreement from more than 1/3rd of the group in doing so. If there is a case of false alarm 
introduced by the leader or by any other member, the protocol reinstates the suspended process 
when the sequencer (leader) is not able to gather enough proof to brand the member as 
faulty/malicious. We proceed to remove the faulty/malicious members through the Three Phase 
Commit protocol. 
4 Protocol Details 
4.1 Assumptions 
 
In our protocol, we assume that there are ‘n’ members in the group. Each view of a group is 
represented by a group id (gid). We assume a timed asynchronous communication model [11], 
where processes in the group do not need to synchronize clocks. Hence the model is 
asynchronous; but we use timeouts as a means to handle the difficult problem of distinguishing 
between a communication failure and a failure/corruption of the group member. We assume that 
any group member can suspect failure/corruption of another group member.  
 
We assume the existence of a trustworthiness detector and an atomic broadcast protocol. The 
trustworthiness detector of FITS [21] has been specifically built for a group communication 
system. Its design is based on two important principles: (1) focusing on observable effects, and 
(2) detection in depth. This detector is generic in the sense that it is independent of the actual 
broadcast or group membership protocol being supported by the group communication system. It 
acts on inputs received from a variety of sources, including the atomic broadcast and group 
membership protocols. Based on the information received from all these sources and a policy file, 
the detector raises a suspicion event whenever it suspects a group member. The detector provides 
a generic interface through which an atomic broadcast or a group membership protocol can 
communicate any abnormal behaviors they observe.  
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The atomic broadcast protocol of FITS is a rotating sequencer-based protocol similar to the 
Pinwheel atomic broadcast protocol described in [10]. This protocol adopts a rotating 
sequencer/leader mechanism, i.e. the group member that assigns global ordering on broadcast 
messages changes on every broadcast of a control message. The sequence of the leader is fixed in 
advance based on its unique rank. The member with highest rank acts as the leader first; the 
member with next lower rank acts as the leader next, and so on. This rotating feature helps in 
balancing the processing load, which is the main limitation of a fixed leader-based broadcast 
protocol. Since the leader performs the task of a sequencer in this reliable broadcast protocol, we 
use the terms leader and sequencer interchangeably. The member’s fault detector (trustworthiness 
detector) invokes the suspect function thereby instructing the group membership protocol to 
broadcast a suspect message to all the members of the group. We assume a public key 
cryptosystem where each group member possesses a private key PKi known only to itself with 
which it can sign messages digitally. We also assume that each group member can obtain the 
public keys of other group members as needed with which it can authenticate the messages. 
 
Each Member maintains four lists i.e. Member List (ML), Suspected List (SL), Suspended List 
(SusL) and Faulty List (FL) to keep track of the status of all members in the group. 
 
1. Member List (ML): List of all correct members that are currently part of the group. For 
convenience let us say that there are ‘n’ correct members. 
2. Suspected List (SL): List of members that is suspected as being faulty/corrupt. Each member 
has its own copy of the Suspected List. 
3. Suspended List (SusL): List of members that have been suspended by the sequencer. Now 
each member ‘i’ in the above list is the header to a list of all members that agree on the 
suspension of the ith   Suspended member. Let us call this list- SusL[i]. 
4. Faulty List (FL): List of members that are considered faulty and are to be removed by the 
group membership protocol. 
 
Members discard any messages sent from any member in SusL. Each group member has to agree 
to another member’s view of status of the group. The system is in the stable and consistent state 
when there is agreement on the above. We adopt a sequencer based Pre-Membership protocol 
until the Three-phase Commit protocol is initiated. The output of the group membership protocol 
at any time will be the view generated from the two lists i.e. the member list (ML) and Faulty List 
(FL). 
4.2 Group Membership Protocol 
 
The intrusion tolerant group membership protocol can be classified into three independent 
protocol modules that are closely coupled with the reliable broadcast mechanism. We classify 
them as follows: 
 
Pre-Membership Suspension Protocol: This protocol is started when members of a group raise 
suspicion/suspicions on one or more of the current group members. The other group members and 
the leader (sequencer) decide on whether to remove the suspected member or reinstate the 
suspected member in case of a false alarm. 
 
Three Phase Commit Protocol: It is agreed upon that one or more group members have to be 
removed and the suspended list is empty. The members in the faulty list (FL) are to be removed 
from the group. These members are removed based on the standard 3 Phase commitment strategy 
with the following phases: 
 5
University of Colorado, Department of Computer Science Technical Report CU-CS-967-04 
-  Consensus on New group  
-  New View Agreement 
-  Commit and Message Stabilization. 
 
Group Join Protocol: The group members have to agree upon any new member joining the 
group. A mechanism to ensure the group members join correctly is to allow more than one group 
member to agree on allowing the new member to join the group. We devise a method of 
incorporating “Trusted Group Join” using the standard three-phase commitment strategy. The 
members in the group go through the Pre-Join phase before the actual Join phase where the 
member joins the group. 
 
4.3 Pre-Membership Suspension Protocol 
 
An important requirement to build an intrusion tolerant service is to ensure that the application is 
providing service to its clients as long as possible. This leads to a situation where it is important 
to remove the faulty/malicious member as soon as possible but without sacrificing on correctness 
of choice of the faulty/malicious member. We introduce the Pre-Membership phase where the 
application is still providing service to the clients but a suspension protocol would be run in the 
background. The state transition diagram of the pre-membership phase is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1:  State Transition Diagram for the Pre-Membership Suspension Protocol 
 
1)  Operational Member multicasts a Control message (Suspect, Ordering) 
2) Operational Leader multicasts Control message (Update_Ordering, Suspect, Suspend or 
Reinstate). 
3) Operational Leader multicasts Suspend (m’) and adds m’ to its SusL. 
4) Operational Member receives Suspend (m’) from Leader and adds m to its SusL. 
5) Operational Member receives Reinstate (m’) from Leader and removes m from its SusL. 
6) Operational Leader receives Suspect (m’) message from member m  
Operational 
Member 
Member_Wait 
Phase 
Suspended
State 
Group 
Membership 
Protocol
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7) Leader moves to wait phase when gathering |Suspend[i]| > n/3 for some i 
8) Member moves to wait phase when gathering |Suspended[i]| > n/3 for some i 
9) Leader multicasts Suggest_New_View message 
10) Member receives Suggest_New_View message 
 
Since we adopt a rotating sequencer in our multicast protocol, it is imperative to handle the 
different cases that arise carefully. We assume that a group is a priory in existence, and its 
members are ranked by the protocol initiator. This protocol begins when a member in the group 
of processes issues a suspect message based on the suspicion raised by the Trustworthiness 
Detector (TD) [21]. A group member ‘m’ receives a suspect event from its TD. The member 
broadcasts a suspect (m, m’) message i.e. member m suspects m’ to the sequencer (Operational 
leader). It updates its Data Structures and starts a timer - Snd_Suspect [m’]. It waits for the 
sequencer to respond to the suspect message. On expiry of the timer (which means there is no 
response from the sequencer), TD of the member is informed of a suspicion on the sequencer. 
The sequencer waits for one or more group members (other than its own suspicion) to receive 
suspect (m, m’) messages on the suspected member by populating a data structure called 
Agreement List (AL). The value of |AL [i] = m’] is an indicator of how many members agree on 
the suspicion of a particular member m’ and when this value crosses a threshold (flexibly set by 
the sequencer). The sequencer updates the suspended list by checking if there is an entry of m’ in 
SusL[i] where i = m’. If there is none, add SusL [m’]. Then, add the signed message, Suspect (m, 
m’) to SusL [m’]. We add the signed message as a confirmation that there is a member m who 
suspects m’. The sequencer finally multicasts a Suspend (m, m’) message i.e. member m’ is 
suspected by m. Each member starts the Recv_Suspend (m’) timer on receipt of this message. If 
this timer expires, it means m’ is in the suspended state for quite a period of time without further 
suspicions on the member. So, we assume it is wrongly suspected and we should remove it from 
the suspended list so that it can participate in future communication of the group. The sequencer 
then issues a reinstate (m’) message and performs an out-of-band state transfer to the rejoining 
member.  
 
All operational members who receive a Suspend (m, m’) message from the sequencer update their 
own SusL [m’] lists; start the timer Recv_Suspend [m’] and check if the number of suspicions on 
a particular suspended member exceeds 1/3rd the total number of the group. If this timer expires, 
and the member is not reinstated, the member informs its trustworthiness detector to raise a 
suspicion on the sequencer as a suspended member should be either deemed faulty or be 
reinstated into the group within the expiry of the above timer. We check if the number of 
members under SusL [m’] is more than 1/3rd +1. We require to use this value because of the 
assumption that there can be at most one-third of group members that can turn malicious and the 
value 1/3rd +1 means that at least one correct group member agree that m’ is faulty. The 
operational member enters the Member_Wait phase whenever the number of members in its SusL 
[m’] exceeds 1/3rd +1. Similarly, the Leader (sequencer) enters the Leader_Wait phase when it 
has received support for the suspension from more than 1/3rd of the group members and starts the 
Leader_Wait timer. On expiry of the timer the suspected members are moved into either the 
faulty list or are reinstated into the group. 
 
When this wait phase is reached, the member stops accepting application messages, the sequencer 
role does not rotate when it reaches the Leader_Wait phase. The suspected members are updated 
as being either faulty members in the FL list of each of the members or reinstated in the event of 
Leader_Wait timer expiry. Each member knows who the next sequencer in the group is, based on 
the rank. Once the sequencer enters its wait phase, it issues a Suggest_New_View message to the 
group. Each member also maintains a queue of members that are to be reinstated so that when it 
assumes the role of the Sequencer, it has to reinstate all the members who are in the Reinstate 
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Queue (RQ). Another important function is the clearance of the buffers created to model 
suspicion supports in Suspended List. A buffer clearance timer is started when this list is formed 
and it expires when the members are moved either to the Faulty List (FL) or are reinstated. This 
phase culminates when the leader issues Suggest_New_View message; thereby indicating the 
beginning of the membership protocol to remove the faulty/malicious members. 
4.4 Three Phase Commit Protocol 
 
The Three Phase Commit protocol starts when any group member receives a Suggest_New_View 
message from the Leader. The protocol we use to remove the faulty/malicious members is very 
similar to Rampart, except that we handle multiple failures received as input from the Pre-
Membership Suspension protocol. The state transition diagram explains the stages of a group 
member while executing the Three Phase Commit protocol. It is important to know the leader role 
does not change once this protocol begins and no suspect messages are entertained except for 
suspicions on the Leader. Hence membership failures raised in the Pre-Membership Suspension 
protocol guide the removal of the members in the Faulty List (FL). The leader election protocol is 
one of the most common problems in distributed systems. So we adopt the standard strategy of 
deputy initiating a leader election protocol and ensuring message consistency.  
 
 
Leader_Wa
it Phase 
 
 
 
 
          
                     
                        1                                                 2                                     3 Consensus Agreement
 Phase Phase 
 
 
Commit 
Phase 
Member_
Wait phase 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: State Transition Diagram for a Group Membership Protocol 
 
1. Received Suggest_New_View from the leader(sequencer) 
2. Received Ready_to _Commit from the leader(sequencer) 
3. Received Commit_New_View from the leader(sequencer) 
 
The first phase of the Three Phase Commit protocol is the Consensus phase. This is the phase 
where the sequencer broadcasts to all the members of the new view, |ML-FL-SusL|. As soon as a 
group member enters this phase, it starts a timer for the leader to proceed to the next phase. Once 
this timer expires, and if the sequencer does not issue the “Ready to commit” message, the 
Trustworthiness Detector [21] is informed to raise a suspicion on the leader thereby starting the 
leader election protocol. 
 
During the Consensus phase, the group member broadcasts an acknowledgement if it agrees on 
the new view. It starts a timer on this broadcast, which on expiry informs the TD to suspect the 
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Leader as faulty or malicious. Once the Leader receives the acknowledgments from majority of 
correct members (more than 2/3rd of the current value of |ML-FL-SusL|), then the Leader sends a 
“Ready to Commit” message. On receipt of this message, the group members move to the 
“Agreement” phase. The group members start a timer so as to ensure the correct operation of the 
Leader and raise a suspicion if its behavior is inconsistent with the group. The Leader must issue 
a “Commit” message to all the members of the group within the timer expiry. During the 
Agreement phase, the Leader waits for more than 2/3rd of the |ML-FL-SusL| (majority response) 
to respond to its “Ready to Commit” message. On receipt of majority response, the Leader issues 
a Commit message. On receipt of the Commit message, the protocol commits to the new view 
and each group member update the membership status of the group accordingly. The Leader 
ensures final message stabilization at the end of this protocol. 
4.5 Group Join Protocol 
 
One of the requirements of a group membership protocol is to allow membership joins provided 
the members are correct and verified to be so. This protocol provides a mechanism for new 
members to join securely. We assume the existence of a Public Key infrastructure. An important 
thing to note is the join protocol is an independent protocol i.e. it cannot run in the background 
while a member or a set of members are being suspected/removed. It is clear that when a member 
has to be added to a group or a set of processes, then it should be efficiently authorized to join 
and also authenticated. One of the key issues while building a join protocol is the matter of trust. 
If the joiner(i.e. the member who intends to join) contacts one member in the group and issues 
proof to the group, that he is correct and has authenticated with a member of the group, then we 
cannot automatically include the process into the group. This is because the group member that 
took part in the join protocol may have been suspected/deemed faulty. The alternative solution is 
entrust the protocol to rely on the Byzantine agreement i.e. more than  1/3rd of the group have to 
agree on the new member to be included in the group. This ensures that atleast one correct 
member has accepted the member to join the group. The state transition diagram for each group 
member is given below. The dashed-joiner and interactions with operational member/leader (in 
figure 3 shown below) indicate the control flow in the Pre-join protocol.   
 
Pre-Join protocol: 
 
We adopt the strategy of having an out of band mechanism through which the member that 
intends to join the group (joiner) contacts various members of the group and issues his intent to 
join the group with his signature. This is the start point of our Join protocol. The biggest 
challenge during the Pre-Join phase is to securely join a new member to the group with proof that 
more than 1/3rd of the group having accepted his intention to join. This can be solved by a 
challenge-respond protocol between the leader and the joiner of the group. Let PKj, PKm,PKl 
represent  the public key of the joiner, operational member and operational leader respectively. 
The joiner i.e. the joining member contacts one or more members of the group with a 
Join_Interest (gid, PKj) message i.e. SKj (gid, PKj). The members of the group respond back with 
a ticket of their own (although without timestamp). This ticket is the acknowledgement to the 
Join_Interest message i.e. Ack_Join_Interest (memberid, SKm (gid, PKj)). This is collected from 
more than 1/3rd of the group members. The next phase is the challenge-respond phase where the 
leader challenges the joiner before allowing him to join the group. The joiner sends a 
Request_to_Join (gid, PKj) message. The leader generates a challenge by creating a nonce which 
is encrypted with PKj i.e. PKj (nonce) in response to the Request_to_Join message and requests 
the joiner to send the nonce signed with the leader’s public key. The joiner responds to the 
challenge by extracting the nonce and sending this back encrypted with the public key of the 
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leader. After this message, the joiner is authenticated by the leader. So, after the leader issues an 
acknowledgement of receipt of the response to the challenge he set, then a signed message (gid, 
X) is sent by the joiner, where X is the collected Ack_Join_Interest tickets. This cryptographic 
authentication mechanism ensures protection from replay attacks or any other man-in-the-middle 
attacks. The leader issues an Ack_Joiner_Request_to_Join message to the joiner and starts the 
Group Join protocol. Since, the joining member is still not a part of the group, it waits until it 
receives the New_Group message. 
                                                                 
 
 Suggest_New_Group Join     
Consensus 
Join     
Agreement 
 
 
 
  
              Request_to_Join                                                                   New_Group                                
  Message                                                                     Message  
 
 
 
              leader 
                                                         
 
 
    Challenge        Receive                                     Send 
    Respond      Join_Interest                         Ack_Join_Interest      
 Mechanism       Message                                 Message 
                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: State Transition Diagram of a Group-Join protocol with the Control flow transitions in 
the Pre-join phase. 
 
Join Protocol: 
 
We propose a join protocol which is similar to the Three Phase Commit protocol used to remove 
group members. So each member goes through the following phases once the joiner is approved 
to join the group by the Pre-Join phase. On receipt of the signed Request_to_Join from the leader, 
each group member moves to the Join Consensus phase. The current sequencer performs the role 
of leader and allows the joiner to enter the group when more than 1/3rd of the total group members 
have acknowledged the Request_to_Join message. On receipt of more than 1/3rd the number of 
Ack_Request_to_Join messages the sequencer issues a Suggest_New_Group message (gid, pid of 
the new joiner, signature of joiner, proof for New View) and all group members enter the Join 
Agreement phase on receipt of the Suggest_New_Group message. The application is stopped at 
this phase. The Leader awaits Suggest _Ack_New_Group messages from more than 2/3rd the 
number of members in the group. On receipt of more than 2/3rd Suggest_Ack_New_Group 
messages, the leader issues a New_Group view message to the group. All members move to the 
Join Commit Phase on receipt of this message. The leader should also transmit state of the 
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protocol to the new group member. We assume this is done by an out-of-band mechanism of state 
transfer. The group members form the new view, include the group member; but they do 
acknowledge New_Group messages. On receipt of this message all members check their state and 
see to that it’s up to date with inclusion of the new group member. 
5 Implementation and Performance 
As observed in [30], all intrusion-tolerant group membership protocols adopt a three-phase 
commit protocol mechanism to remove failed members from a group. Our protocol also makes 
use of this mechanism. The main difference between our group membership protocol and other 
intrusion-tolerant group membership protocols is the introduction of the new state called 
suspended group membership state. This state is introduced to balance the effect of false alarm 
and tardiness of confining malicious behaviors. So, we have focused on the effect of this new 
suspended group membership state in our performance measurements. In particular, we want to 
measure the additional cost imposed by the suspended group membership state and the benefit 
that we can get from it. 
We implemented our intrusion group membership protocol in C++ in NS2 that was developed at 
UC Berkeley. We also implemented the rotating-sequencer based atomic broadcast protocol using 
negative acknowledgement mechanism. To measure the performance of our group membership 
protocol, we experimented with groups of sizes four to twelve. All group members join a single 
multicast network. During group formation, each member is assigned a unique rank i, where i = 1 
to n and n is the group size. The member with the highest rank is the first leader. We simulated 
failures of one and two members in the group. For one member failure, we triggered a member to 
send Suspect (m, m’) immediately after the group was formed. No background traffic was 
generated in this test. So the performance that we measured represents the protocol cost only. 
Based on our failure model, a group whose size is larger than six members can tolerate two 
failures. For these groups, we triggered two member failures detected by different members in the 
group at the same time. 
 
In order to measure the effect of the suspended group membership state, we compare our protocol 
with a standard three-phase commit based group membership protocol (e.g. [29], termed as STD 
GMP in Figures 4 and 5). For STD GMP, the protocol cost consists of the time interval starting 
from the beginning of the first phase until the end of the third phase. Recall that the first phase 
starts after one-third of the group members have suspected a faulty member. For our protocol 
(termed as FITS GMP in Figures 4 and 5), the protocol cost consists of the time interval starting 
from the beginning of the pre-membership suspension phase until the end of the third phase of the 
three-phase commit protocol. Recall that the pre-membership suspension phase starts when a first 
member suspects a group member and sends a suspect message.  
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the protocol cost in milliseconds for removing one and two group members 
respectively. The line marked “STD GMP” illustrates the protocol cost for a standard three-phase 
commit group membership protocol, while the line marked “FITS GMP” illustrates the protocol 
cost for our intrusion-tolerant group membership protocol. The difference between these two 
lines is the time a compromised group member remains suspended before being considered 
faulty.  
 
There are three observations we make from these two figures. First, the protocol cost increases 
with increase in the size of the group. This is an expected behavior, because the number of 
messages exchanged in the group by the group membership protocol depends directly on the size 
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of the group. Second, there is a sudden increase in protocol cost when group size increases from 6 
to 7 and from 9 to 10. This is because the three-phase commit protocol starts only after one-third 
of the group members have suspected a faulty member. This number (one-third) increases when 
the group size increases from 6 to 7 and from 9 to 10. 
 
Finally, the time a faulty group member remains in suspended group membership state varies 
from about 50 milliseconds to 100 milliseconds. This is the time interval during which this 
member is considered a normal (non-faulty) group member by earlier intrusion-tolerant group 
membership protocols. In other words, the introduction of the suspended group membership state 
results in reducing the time a compromised group member gets to launch attacks by as much as as 
100 milliseconds. Notice that the application running on top of the group communication system 
observes a similar behavior, whether FITS group membership protocol is used or a standard 
three-phase commit group membership protocol is used. We can see that the introduction of the 
suspended group membership state does not adversely affect an application, but does reduce the 
amount of time a compromised group member gets to launch attacks and damage the state of a 
group communication system.  
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Figure 4: Protocol cost when one member in the group is faulty. 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
7 8 9 10 11 12
Group Size
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
INT GMP
RG GMP
 
 
Figure 5: Protocol cost when two members in the group are faulty. 
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6 Discussion 
 
With increasing use of computing systems to construct critical as well as non-critical applications, 
it is clear that high availability and trustworthiness are the most important requirements of 
modern computing systems. Building intrusion-tolerant group communication systems is a step 
towards fulfilling these requirements. A group membership protocol is a very important and 
perhaps the most complicated part of a group communication system. Research in building 
intrusion-tolerant group membership protocols is at a preliminary stage at present. In this paper, 
we have described the design, implementation, and performance evaluation of a new intrusion-
tolerant group membership protocol.  
 
The main contribution of this protocol is the introduction of a new group membership state called 
the suspended membership state. A group member is suspended as soon as it is suspected by a 
small number of group members. However, the protocol to remove a suspected group member 
from its group is initiated only after the suspicion has been confirmed by at least 1/3rd of the 
group members. Once a member is suspended, it is not allowed to participate in any group 
communication activity. As a result, a member whose security is compromised gets only a very 
small amount of time (until it is suspected by a small number of group members) to launch any 
attacks in its group. It may be reinstated into the group if the initial suspicions turn out to be false 
at some later point in time. This concept of suspended membership state allows us to severely 
limit the damages a compromised group member can cause. 
 
We have implemented this group membership protocol and measured its performance when a 
single member is compromised, and when two members are compromised. To evaluate this 
performance, we have also measured the performance of a three-phase group membership 
protocol that does not include a suspended membership state. The performance measurements 
show that the introduction of the new suspended membership state reduces the amount of time 
during which a compromised group member can launch attacks by as much as 100 milliseconds. 
We are currently building a complete group communication system called FITS integrating the 
group membership protocol proposed in this paper with the trustworthiness detector proposed in 
[21], an atomic broadcast protocol similar to the one proposed in [10], and an appropriate 
cryptographic package integrated to the system. 
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APPENDIX: Pseudo Code for Pre-Membership Phase 
 
Global: 
State[i] = {Operational Member, Operational Sequencer, Suspend, Member_Wait, 
Sequencer_Wait, Consensus, Join Consensus, Agreement, Join Agreement, Commit, Join 
Commit} 
ML: Member List; SL: Suspected List; SusL: Suspended List; FL: Faulty List; 
RQ: A Queue of processes that are to be reinstated by the Leader; 
 
Function Member (State[i], s) 
Start 
LSN, GSN, gid, m, m’, s, MyRank: integers 
Current_State: String 
Event-While the message is a GMP message start membership protocol: 
 
While (Recvd_Message (M, State[i]) is not a Join message) do 
 
Event-Received message M: 
if (Cryptocheck(M) fails) then 
 Inform_TD (m); //Inform TD to raise suspicion on member who sent the message 
exit; 
else     // the Cryptographic verification of the message is successful  
 
 Current_State = State[i]; 
 
Event-Suspect (m’) initiated by the Trustworthiness Detector event: 
if ( M = Send_Suspect_Message (m, m’) & Current_State = Operational Member) then 
Increment LSN;  
Update the Suspected list (SL) to include m’  
Start Snd_Suspect (m’) timer;  
Run Multicast (m, gid, Send_Suspect_Message, Current_State, LSN, GSN); 
endif 
 
Event-Received Suspect (m’) from member m:  
if ( M = Recv_Suspect_Message (m, m’) and Current_State = Operational Member) then 
      if (m’ is one of the suspended members) then 
Update SuspendedList[i] i.e. SusL[i] =m’ by building the list of nodes that  
  suspect m’ (SusL[i]);   
//Check if the total number of nodes exceeds the requirement to start GMP 
if (SusL[i].totalnodes >  ⎣ ⎦3/)1( −n ) then 
     Update Faulty List to include m’ i.e. SusL[i] 
           Start Member_Wait timer;  
      Current_State= Member_Wait;  
     Run Member_Wait (Current_State, s); 
endif 
// I am the next sequencer; so change state to Operational Sequencer  
if ( MyRank = s – 1) and m = s ) then 
  Current_State = Operational Sequencer; 
  Run Leader (Current_State); 
 endif 
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      else 
     // Build the database of members suspecting m’. Clear buffer after timer expiry 
 Start Buffer_Clearance timer;  
Create/Update SuspendedList[i] i.e. SusL[i] =m’ by building the list of nodes that suspect 
m’ (SusL[i]); 
     endif 
endif 
 
 
Event-Received Suspend (m’) from leader s:  
if (M = Recv_Suspend_Message (s, m’) and Current_State = Operational Member) then  
// If the current member is the suspended member  
Start Recv_Suspend (m’) timer; 
if (m’=MyRank) then  
  Current_State=Suspend; 
  Run Suspend (Current_State, s); 
  break; 
 else if ( m’=s) then 
Inform_TD(s); //Inform TD to raise suspicion on sequencer 
break; 
else  
Update the Suspended List to include m’ 
endif 
 
 
Event-Received Reinstate (m’) from leader s:  
if (M = Recv_Reinstate_Message (s, m’) and Current_State = Operational Member) then 
 Update RQ to remove m’  
if ( m’ is part of SusL) 
  Remove reinstated member from SusL 
        Add the reinstated member to ML  
else  
  Inform_TD(s); //Inform TD to raise suspicion on sequencer 
  break; 
endif 
endif 
 
 
Event-Received Ordering (s, GSN, LSN) from leader s:  
if (M=Update_Ordering (s, New_GSN, last_received_LSN) ) then 
 if ( New_GSN=GSN+1) then // if GSN is the correct one received 
  if (last_received_LSN=LSN-1) then 
   GSN=new_GSN; // if the LSN last sent 
  else  
   Send message with LSN=last_received_LSN+1; 
  endif 
 else  
  Request all messages from GSN+1 to New_GSN //Use Negative ACKs 
 endif 
endif 
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Event-Expiry of  Snd_Suspect (m’) or Member_Wait timer 
if ( Snd_Suspect(m’) or Member_Wait timer expires) then 
Inform_TD(s); //Inform Trustworthiness Detector to raise suspicion on sequencer 
 break; 
endif 
 
Event-Expiry of Recv_Suspend(m’) timer 
if ( Recv_Suspend(m’) timer expires) then 
 if (m’ belongs to SusL and is not a part of ML or FL) then 
  Create/Update the RQ by including m’  
endif 
 
Event-Expiry of Buffer_Clearance timer 
 
Clear Suspended List[i] i.e. SUSL[i] =m’; 
Inform_TD(s); //Inform Trustworthiness Detector to raise suspicion on sequencer 
break; 
 
endif // Successful Cryptocheck 
end while-do 
Run Join (Current_State, s); // If the multicast message is not a membership protocol message 
end Member 
 
//This explains how the protocol behaves when a correct member is accidentally suspected and 
enters Suspended Membership State. 
Function Suspend (Current_State, s) 
Start 
Seq_rank: integer 
While (Recvd_Message (M, State[i]) and Snd_Suspend (m’) has not expired) do 
      Seq_rank=s; 
      if (Cryptocheck(M) fails) then 
 Inform_TD (m);  
exit; 
      else   if (M = Recv_Reinstate_Message (s, m’) and Current_State = Suspend) then 
// Let the current sequencer do the State transfer  
  Current_State=Operational Member; 
  Run State_Transfer(s, Current_State); 
        endif 
  end while-do 
End Suspend 
 
// This function explains the Member_Wait phase where the sequencer becomes the leader and no 
suspect messages are entertained 
Function Member_Wait (Current_State, s) 
Start 
While (Recvd_Message (M, State[i]) and Member_Wait timer has not expired) do 
        // While only the faulty list is updated  
 if (M=Update_Member_Wait(m’) 
  Update Faulty List to include m’ 
 endif 
 if (M=Recv_Suggest_New_View( gid, ML, FL, SusL, SL, s) then 
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  Current_State=Consensus; 
  Start Leader_Consensus timer;  
  // Run the Standard Three Phase Commit Protocol  
                        Run ThreePC (MyRank, gid, ML, FL, SusL, SL, s, Current_State) 
 endif 
 
Event-Expiry of Leader_Consensus timer 
 if ( Leader_Consensus expires) then 
 Inform_TD(s); //Inform Trustworthiness Detector to raise suspicion on sequencer 
  break; 
endif 
 
end while-do  
End Member_Wait 
 
Function Leader (State[i]) 
Start 
Current_State=State[i]; 
MyRank, m, m’, gid, t, s, LSN, GSN: integers 
AL=List of Members that agree to suspect a particular member m’; 
 
Event-Reinstate Queue (RQ) is not empty:  
 
if (RQ is not empty) then 
      while (RQ[i] not in FL or ML for all i ) do 
 Run Multicast(s, gid, Send_Reinstate_Message, Current_State, LSN, GSN);  
 Remove RQ[i] from the SusL; 
 Run State Transfer (); 
       end while-do  
endif 
 
Event-Received Suspect (m’) from member m:  
if ( M = Recv_Suspect_Message (m, m’) and Current_State = Operational Leader) then 
      if (m’ is one of the suspended members) then 
Update Suspended List by building the list of nodes that suspect m’ (SusL[i]); 
 //Check if the total number of nodes exceeds the requirement to start GMP 
if (SusL[i].total nodes >  ⎣ ⎦3/)1( −n ) then 
     Update Faulty List to include m’ i.e. SusL[i] 
     Start Leader_Wait timer;  
      Current_State= Leader_Wait;  
     Run Leader_Wait (Current_State, s); 
endif 
      else // A suspect message has arrived but wait for agreement  
 Add m to the Agreement List where AL[i] =m’; 
 if (|AL|>= t) then 
     Increment LSN, GSN; 
     Run Multicast (s, gid, Send_Suspend_Message, Current_State, LSN, GSN); 
    Current_State=Operational Member; 
     Run Member (Current_State); 
 endif 
 19
University of Colorado, Department of Computer Science Technical Report CU-CS-967-04 
     endif 
endif 
 
Event-Received Suspect (m’) from Trustworthiness Detector:  
if (M = Send_Suspect_Message (s, m’) & Current_State = Operational Leader) then 
Add s to the Agreement List where AL[i] =m’; 
Update the suspected list (SL) to include m’  
 if (|AL|>=t) then 
      Increment LSN, GSN; 
     Run Multicast (s, gid, Send_Suspend_Message, Current_State, LSN, GSN); 
else 
     Increment LSN;  
     Run Multicast(s, gid, Send_Suspect_Message, Current_State, LSN, GSN); 
endif 
Current_State=Operational Member; 
Run Member (Current_State); 
endif 
 
Event-Received Suspend (m’) from leader s:  
 
if (M = Recv_Suspend_Message (s, m’) & Current_State = Operational Leader) then 
 Start Recv_Suspend timer 
 Update the Suspended List to include m’ 
endif 
 
Event-Expiry of Leader_Wait timer 
if ( Leader_Wait expires) then 
       Run Multicast (s, gid, Suggest_New_View, Current_State, LSN, GSN); 
endif 
 
Function Leader_Wait (State [i], s) 
Start 
while (Recvd_Message (M, State[i]) and Leader_Wait timer has not expired) do 
    if ( M = Recv_Suspect_Message (m, m’) and Current_State = Leader_Wait) then 
              if (m’ is one of the suspended members and not in FL) then 
Update Suspended List by building the list of nodes that suspect m’ (SusL[i]); 
 //Check if the total number of nodes exceeds the requirement to start GMP 
if (SusL[i].total nodes >  ⎣ ⎦3/)1( −n ) then 
       Update Faulty List to include m’ i.e. SusL[i] 
  endif 
         endif 
 endif 
end-while-do  
 
while (SusL[i] is not empty) do 
Run Multicast(s, gid, Send_Reinstate_Message, Current_State,LSN, GSN); 
Update the RQ by removing m’; 
  Run State Transfer (); 
Current_State=Operational Member; 
Run Member (Current_State); 
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end-while do  
 
Event-All Suspended Members are Faulty 
if (SusL[i].total nodes >   for all i) then   ⎣ 3/)1( −n ⎦
 // Send the Suggest New View Message  
Run Multicast (gid, Suggest_New_View, Current_State, LSN, GSN); 
Current_State=Consensus; 
Run Leader-ThreePC (s, gid, ML, FL, SusL, SL, Current_State) 
endif 
 
Event-Expiry of Recv_Suspend(m’) timer 
if ( Recv_Suspend(m’) timer expires) then 
 Run Multicast(s, gid, Send_Reinstate_Message, Current_State, LSN, GSN); 
Update the RQ by removing m’; 
  Run State Transfer (); 
Current_State=Operational Member; 
Run Member (Current_State); 
endif 
 
End Leader_Wait 
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